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Abstract
This presentation explores the significance of just military preparedness (JMP), or jus ante
bellum as a new category of just war theory, for just war thinking, especially with regard to
irregular warfare. It articulates six just military preparedness (JMP) principles. It further
discusses how America’s military preparation fails the JMP principles and how this negatively
impacts its capability to justly initiate, execute, and conclude (irregular) war. This critical
analysis takes as its point of departure (former) Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s view that the
Pentagon needs to be “reprogrammed” toward a “balanced strategy” of preparing for both
conventional and irregular warfare.
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Just Military Preparedness and Irregular Warfare

In several recent papers, I have argued that just war theory (JWT) is in need of a fourth category
of just war thinking (in addition to jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum) with its own
principles (van der Linden, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). I call this category “just military
preparedness,” or, in line with the commonly used naming of the other JWT categories, it may be
called jus potentia ad bellum, or, more briefly (but less accurately), jus ante bellum. Military
preparedness raises two types of justice concerns. First, we may raise questions about whether
the military preparation of a country is just toward its military personnel, places a fair burden on
the civilian population, reflects adequate civilian control, and the like. Second, we may raise
questions about whether the military preparation of a country is such that it is conducive to the
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country resorting to force only when justice is on its side as well as to executing and concluding
war in a just manner. My ultimate concern is military preparedness that is just in the second
sense – that is, how should we prepare for the possibility of military conflicts so that wars will be
only justly initiated, executed, and concluded? However, since military preparedness that lacks
justice in the first sense will be an obstacle to realizing justice in the second sense, my JMP
principles also aim at addressing justice in the first sense.
My main focus in this paper is to explore the significance of JMP for just war thinking,
especially with regard to irregular warfare. I will proceed as follows. First, I will state six just
military preparedness (JMP) principles and briefly explicate each of them in general (rather than
with regard to irregular warfare only). Next, I will discuss how America’s military preparation
fails the JMP principles and how this negatively impacts its capability to justly initiate, execute,
and conclude (irregular) war. My point of departure here will be Defense Secretary Robert
Gates’s view that the Pentagon needs to be “reprogrammed” toward a “balanced strategy” of
preparing for both conventional and irregular warfare.

I. Just Military Preparedness Principles

1. The basic defense structure of a country, should accord with its general purpose of using
military force only for the sake of protecting people against massive human rights infringements
caused by large-scale armed violence.
Explication: It is widely accepted that national self-defense, assisting an ally in its national selfdefense, and protecting a population against genocide are just causes for war. This first JMP
principle assumes that the rational core of these causes is that resort to force is only justified to
protect against massive human rights violations. Notably, mere violation of territorial integrity is
not an adequate cause for resort to force (cf. May 2008, 103). Terrorist acts typically require
police action, not a military response (Cortright and Lopez 2007). The principle requires weapon
systems appropriate to the tasks of human rights protection by force. Most obviously, this means
that nuclear weapons should be abolished and that a weaponization of space should be avoided
(Van der Linden 2010). The principle also requires a defensive military posture, not global
power projection (Van der Linden, 2009a).
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2. Military personnel should be trained with this general purpose in mind and participate in
moral decision-making concerning the initiation and execution of military force.

Explication: The military as experts of human rights protection by force should be experts in
avoiding excessive force. Current military training in the United States falls short in this regard.
Timothy Challans (2007, 24) writes: “The vast majority of military students I have personally
taught in the classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. [M]ost justify [an] exorbitant
degree of collateral damage…harsh and coercive interrogation measures [and] they are more
than willing to err on the side of excessive force.” In the words of Challans (2007, 186), the
second JMP principle also requires the existence of “legitimate avenues of public reason and
disagreement, dissent, and disobedience within the war machine.” Increased moral competency
among military personnel reduces the risk of wrong resort to force, protracted unjust wars, and
the erroneous continuation of (an otherwise just) military conflict. A corollary is that military
personnel should have a full right to selective conscientious refusal.

3. The way that the military draws its personnel from the population at large must reflect that
preparation for, and possible execution of, resort to military force is a collective choice and
enterprise that impacts the moral standing of all citizens of a society and should be expressive of
their values.

Explication: In a democratic society, resort to force should reflect the will of the people and the
moral burdens of war should ultimately rest with the people. A military that is culturally, socioeconomically, ethnically (and so on) not reflective of the citizenry is more likely to engage in
alienated wars defined as wars that are fought in the name of the people but are not viewed by
the people as an expression of their will and responsibility (cf. Ryan 2008). Resort to force
becomes easier with an alienated military (Bacevitch 2005). The principle requires an end to the
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy within the American military. Similarly, there should be a full
integration of women into combat units.

4. Priority should be given to nonmilitary means of preventing massive human rights violations
caused by armed force.
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Explication: As President Obama noted in his Acceptance Speech of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize,
“no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy … [it] is never glorious, and we must
never trumpet it as such.” Accordingly, priority should be given to prevent threats from
materializing rather to meet them militarily. Few politicians do not pay lip service to this point;
however, it is as widely acknowledged in theory as it is ignored in practice.

5. The value of security (against the threat of massive human rights violations by armed force)
and the resources committed to this value must be balanced against other human values (e.g.,
education and health) and the resources set aside for their realization.

Explication: The growing nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War illustrate that increased
military spending may make us less secure, but even increased spending that contributes to our
security must be questioned in light of both its opportunity and actual costs. Two public policy
issues that have recently received much attention exemplify the significance of the fifth JMP
principle: military preparation, not to speak of actual war, is costly in terms of global warming,
while the increasing resources spent on the military during the past decade must be questioned in
terms of the resources needed to provide basic health care to all Americans. 1

6. Matters of military preparedness should be settled by a competent authority with right
intention (e.g., military preparedness for human rights protection, not for profit and employment
opportunities).

Explication: In a democratic society, the representatives of the people should be this competent
authority, requiring them to communicate openly and honestly with the citizens about the costs
and benefits of competing JMP proposals. The defense budget should be transparent to the

1

Arguably, several ten-thousands Americans die prematurely every year due to lack of health insurance.
See http://www.factcheck.org/2009/09/dying-from-lack-of-insurance/. Of course, there are other ways of
addressing this situation besides shifting tax dollars from defense to public health care, but to question
defense allocation from this perspective has the merit that it might put a dent in the habitual support of
politicians and the public at large for the Pentagon budgets.
4

representatives and they should allocate resources free from pressures of weapons manufacturers,
local employment opportunities, and the like.

II. Seeking Balance: the Small Picture

As suggested in my brief explications of the JMP principles, I hold that the United States fails to
satisfy the JPM principles and so clearly falls short of just military preparedness. In a way, this is
hardly a radical view. In “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,”
Defense Secretary Robert Gates makes a variety of critical observations about the military
preparation planning of the Pentagon that underline to some extent that the United States fails to
satisfy the JMP principles, even though Gates would undoubtedly be critical of my specific
interpretation and explication of the JMP principles. On his account, the Pentagon presently fails
to strike a proper balance between allocating resources for ongoing wars, maintaining
conventional military superiority, and developing greater counterinsurgency capabilities (Gates
2009, 1-2).2 The main problem is that the Pentagon is wedded to fighting conventional wars
rather than committed to fighting the irregular wars that the United States increasingly has fought
in the recent past (since the end of the Cold war) and will increasingly fight in the immediate
future. Gates (2009, 2) writes: “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply
embedded in the Defense Department’s budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in
Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support –
including in the Pentagon – for the capabilities needed to win today’s wars and some of their
likely successors.” Gates (2009, 6) notes that one aspect of this conventional orientation of the
Pentagon is that its weapon systems “have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more
costly, are taking longer to build and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities.” Gates
(2009, 7) adds that American soldiers paid a price for this high-tech fixation, posing the
rhetorical question, “why was it necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get
the [low-tech] capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars?”
In short, Gates’s observations confirm that the American military preparation violates the
sixth JMP principle, the competent and right authority principle, and show that as a result the
Page references are made to the electronic copy (10 pages) of Gates’s article in the Academic Search
Premier database.
2
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first JMP principle is also violated. After all, inadequate preparation for irregular warfare means
inadequate preparation for how to use force to protect people from massive human rights
violations through asymmetric violence. Interestingly, Gates even suggests (indirectly, to be
sure) that current military preparation fails in terms of the second JMP principle. He writes: “The
United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to
clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward” (2009, 4). Gates (2009, 4) notes that
“impressive strides” have been made in better equipping and training military personnel for this
purpose. Yet, at the same time, there are “cultural traits” within the American military blocking
progress in this regard. Notably, “we should look askance at idealist, triumphalist, or
ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to transcend the immutable principles and ugly
realities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission,
instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block”
(Gates 2009, 9-10).
Even though I hold that Gates is correct that American military preparedness must partly
shift from conventional warfare to irregular warfare and that institutional and cultural changes
are necessary for this purpose, I disagree with his understanding and explication of irregular
warfare. Once we define conflicts between states fought by their armies as regular warfare and
define all other military acts as irregular warfare, we end up with a notion of irregular warfare
that may obscure important distinctions. On this definition, supporting fighters against an
oppressive regime, fighting insurgents who challenge our occupation of a foreign country,
combating militarily global terrorists who have declared war on the United States, and
intervening in an unfolding genocide in a failed state are all forms of irregular warfare. The
moral issues raised in each case, however, are rather different; the military training needed might
differ in the various cases; and even the kind of military equipment necessary for optimal
execution might not be the same. Accordingly, the issue is not merely to balance preparation for
irregular and conventional warfare, but to find a proper balance within the preparation for
irregular warfare (broadly defined). My view is that the first priority should be preparation for
humanitarian intervention, but I will not try to argue here for this claim.
Not surprisingly, Gates says little about how our JMP failure might negatively impact our
capability to justly initiate, execute, and conclude war. His rejection of “shock and awe” points
to a link between JMP failure and unjust initiation of force: the fixation on America’s military
6

technological superiority may lead one to fail to take into account all the horrors of resort to
force with the result that the jus ad bellum principle of proportionality is misapplied. More
broadly, technologically based triumphalism may lead one to set aside the last resort principle
and even careful reflection on just cause. Surely, Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on
technologically based triumphalism with its guiding idea that “Rapid Dominance” could be
established through “Shock and Awe.” It is worth recalling that Harlan Ullman (2003) predicted
that “2, 3, 4, 5 days” would suffice for complete victory. Gates might be too optimistic that this
lesson has been learned, stating that “the United states is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or
Afghanistan – that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire – anytime
soon.” But, of course, the catch here is what is meant by “anytime soon?”
Furthermore, Gates (2009, 8) bemoans that the improvised transformation of the
American military in Iraq into an effective counterinsurgency “came at a frightful human,
financial, and political cost.” It is not clear whether Gates ignores here, as is so often done, the
human costs to the Iraqis themselves, but, to say the least, the Iraqi civilian suffered not only
from a drawn-out conflict, as such, but also from an American military violating the jus in bello
principle of discrimination (due to its failure to satisfy the second JMP principle). 3 The
discrimination problem is also partly caused by the use of inappropriate weapons. Gates might be
too optimistic about the discriminatory capability of high-teach weapons. He writes: “A button
can be pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck will explode in Mosul. A bomb
dropped from the sky can destroy a targeted house while leaving the one next to it intact” (Gates
2009, 9). But targets are missed, regularly misidentified, or often so blended into a civilian
setting that unacceptable collateral damage follows. Generally, it is difficult to upkeep the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants in irregular warfare, especially in
counterinsurgency. (The problem seems less in humanitarian intervention, underlining my
previous claim that it is important to make a distinction between various forms of irregular
warfare.) What adds to the problem is the increasing use of private military contractors (PMCs)
in irregular wars.
Gates is completely silent about PMCs in his plea for a reprogrammed Pentagon. This
neglect is rather striking in light of the currently indispensable role of PMCs in irregular warfare.
George R. Lucas, Jr., (2009, 332-33) writes: “It is wholly impossible, at present, to deploy the
3

For an overstated but still valuable account, see Hedges and Al-Arian 2008.
7

military forces of any of our allied [NATO] nations for any purpose whatsoever, without the
logistical and security support provided by such firms [PMCs) and their contract personnel. This
is the sobering reality of post-modern [irregular warfare] operations, the full and stark
significance of which most nations, governments, and their militaries have yet to fully confront.”
Military preparedness that includes PMCs involves serious violations of the second, third, and
sixth JMP principles. What leads to the violation of the second JMP principle is that PMCs set
their own standards of how to train their personnel morally and militarily. The third principle is
violated because PMCs draw their personnel from numerous nations and have an ethic of profitseeking rather than one of service to the nation. And the sixth PMC principle is violated because
PMC operations are not subject to full democratic oversight and control. The violation of JMP
principles spills over into violation of traditional just war principles. Military personnel from
PMCs have engaged in indiscriminate violence, often without paying any price for doing so, and
their blending with American forces weakens the traditional combatant-noncombatant
distinction, thus posing additional risks to legitimate noncombatants in armed conflict situations.
Credible accusations of corruption and bribery of insurgents have been made against PMCs
operating in Afghanistan (Roston 2009). It might also be case that PMC personnel work together
with US Special Forces in Pakistan, adding to the problem of inadequate oversight and
accountability of covert operations in general (Scahill 2009). We must avoid, though, to make
the PMCs an easy scapegoat since it is ultimately Congress and the Pentagon that allow
convenient accountability gaps within which various wrongdoings and even war crimes are often
committed.

III. Seeking Balance: the Big Picture
Gates’s main concern is to create balance within the defense budget, but he also notes that there
is a misbalance between military spending for the sake of national security and nonmilitary
spending for the same purpose. He writes in reference to the “war on terror” that “over the long
term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” Gates (2009, 2) continues:
“Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures
aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to
address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit.” What Gates
8

has in mind here seems not only that there must be a better balance between nonmilitary and
military measures in fighting a counterinsurgency, but, more broadly, there must be a better
balance between conflict prevention measures and military measures in general. Accordingly,
Gates (2009, 4) argues that the budgets of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development need to be increased. In theory, then, there is recognition that the
fourth JMP principle is violated. The insight is not new among politicians. Even the bellicose
national Security Doctrine of 2002 (section VII) claims that “including all the world’s poor in an
expanding circle of development – and opportunity – is a moral imperative and one of the top
priorities of U.S. international policy” because “a world where some live in comfort and plenty,
while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable.” In fact, this
“top priority” receives very modest funding as compared to defense funding, leaving American
foreign policy militarized. To be sure, budget increases for total foreign operations, including
economic assistance, have been greater in the past few years than the budget increases for
defense, but total foreign operations for FY 2010 is still less than 10% of the defense budget and
economic assistance is less than 5% (Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations, FY
2010, 1-2).4 This is in sharp contrast to the ratio of official development aid to military spending
found Western Europe, ranging up toward 50% in The Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark.
Granted that there is a serious misbalance between preventive and defensive security
measures, it must be concluded that American resort to force has at the outset a moral strike
against it. Once a country fails to invest adequate resources in war prevention through poverty
relief, fair trade, and diplomacy and other nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, and instead
places most resources for security in the military, its claim that its resort to force in a given
situation was a last resort measure has at the outset greatly diminished plausibility. A credible
JWT, then, must insist that the United States greatly rebalances its preventive and defensive
security spending.
Considering that more than 50% of all federal discretionary spending is on defense, the
only viable way to affect a significant rebalancing is to cut defense spending. The fifth JMP
principle also suggests a need for a reduced military budget. So the question must be asked
whether there is a convincing justification for the United States spending about half of the
4

I have not taken into account here that the 2010 international affairs request includes financing for
foreign military (about 10% of the total budget) and that the US military budget is partly located under
budgets other than that of the defense department.
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current global military expenditures and outspending its closest competitor (in terms of military
spending), China, by ratio of approximately 10 to 1. Why do we need to project our military
power across the world and maintain an “empire of bases” (Johnson 2004)? Some common
answers are that American military hegemony is necessary for securing access to oil and other
resources, for expanding or keeping open markets for American corporations, or for creating
employment opportunities at home. These answers have explanatory merit, but they fail as
normative justifications (in accordance with the first JMP principle). 5 The common moral
defense is that American military hegemony is necessary to protect freedom and democracy
across the globe, and that this is ultimately for the sake of our own freedom and democracy at
home. I think that this defense fails. The American military lacks the authority to play global cop
and divide the world -- in an act of stunning hubris -- into regions under its command. In
practice, we all too often engage in imposing freedom and democracy (or something much less
uplifting) instead of protecting these ideals. Moreover, American wars, even when justly
initiated, commonly lead to the establishment of permanent military bases in foreign countries,
often against the local popular will (Lutz 2009). Military hegemony may also make us and our
closest allies less safe because it has such global security costs as leading to asymmetric attacks
against the United States and its allies, as well as to nuclear proliferation (Van der Linden,
2009a, 34-38). Of course, all these claims are controversial and I cannot substantiate them here.
But these claims show, at least, that the issue of whether America’s recent wars have been justly
initiated, executed, and concluded cannot be separated from the question of whether America’s
military preparation is just, thus underlining my main thesis that JWT should add JMP as a new
category of just war thinking.

References

Bacevitch, Andrew J. 2005. The New American Militarism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5

To avoid misunderstanding, members of Congress often seem to support new weapon systems partly
because of the employment opportunities created by their production, but this does not mean that federal
spending on alternatives projects, such as mass transit and infrastructure, might not be better in terms of
creating job opportunities. That downsizing the military would be good overall for employment is argued
by Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2007.
10

Challans, Timothy L. 2007. Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare. Albany: State
University of New York of Press.
Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations, FY 2010. Issued by the State Department, May
22, 2009. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2010/.
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez. 2007. Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary
Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gates, Robert M. 2009. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age.” Foreign
Affairs 88 (January/February): 28-40.
Hedges, Chris, and Lila Al-Arian. 2008. Collateral Damage. New York: Nations Books.
Johnson, Chalmers. 2004. The Sorrows of Empire. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Lucas, George R., Jr. 2009. “This Is Not Your Father’s War: Confronting the Moral Challenges of
‘Unconventional’ War.” Journal of National Security Law & Policy III/2: 331-42.
Lutz, Catherine, ed. 2009. The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts. New
York: New York University Press.
May, Larry. 2008. Aggression and Crimes against Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2002. http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html.
Obama, Barack. 2009. Acceptance Speech of Nobel Peace Prize, December
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/10/obamas_nobel_lecture.

10, 2009.

Pollin, Robert, and Heidi Garrett-Peltier. 2007. The Employment Effects of Downsizing the U.S.
Military. Working Paper Series 152. Political Economy Research Institute. University of Massachusetts,
Amherst.
Roston, Aram. 2009. “How the US Funds the Taliban.” The Nation (November 30): 11-16. 15
Ryan, Cheyney. 2009. The Chickenhawk Syndrome: War, Sacrifice, and Personal Responsibility.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Scahill, Jeremy. 2009. “The Secret US War in Pakistan.” The Nation (December 21/28): 11-18.
Ullman, Harlan. 2003. “’Shock and awe’ lite.” Op-ed in the Baltimore Sun. April 1.
Van der Linden, Harry. 2007. “Just War Theory and U.S. Military Hegemony.” In Brough, Michael W.,
John W. Lango, and Harry van der Linden, eds., Rethinking the Just War Tradition. Albany: State
University of New York Press.

11

Van der Linden, Harry. 2009a. “Questioning the Resort to U.S. Hegemonic Force.” In Ted van Baarda
and Desirée Verweij, eds., The Moral dimensions of asymmetrical warfare: Counter-terrorism, western
values, military ethics. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Van der Linden, Harry. 2009b. Barack Obama, Resort to Force, and U.S. Military Hegemony.
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23/1: 95-104.
Van der Linden, Harry. 2010. “From Hiroshima to Baghdad: Military Hegemony versus Just Military
Preparedness.” Forthcoming in Edward Demenchonok, ed., Philosophy after Hiroshima. Newcastle, UK:
Cambridge Scholars Press.

12

